










Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/128562                             
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
Dr Illan rua Wall1 
School of Law, 
University of Warwick,  
Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK 
Email: i.r.wall@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: The Ordinary Affects of Law 
The article examines the affective dynamics of law in the everyday. It insists upon the importance 
of ‘the background’ for thinking about law. In the everyday cut and thrust of daily life, law tends 
to fade into the background. It becomes unobtrusive, functioning from the background by 
structuring the capacity to act. In other words, it functions affectively. Key to law’s functioning is 
its ability to also move out from the background in certain crucial moments. In this it becomes 
obtrusive, taking centre stage in such a way that its former position in the background becomes 
imperceptible. The movement from background to foreground and back again are essential to 
begin to grasp the manner in which law functions with and through affect. Using the work of 
Kathleen Stewart, Hans Lindahl and Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos the article insists 
upon the importance of the affective dynamics of law. Developing the idea of nestled affects which 
help us to understand the movements from background to foreground. 
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 The Ordinary Affects of Law 
Introduction 
Legal analysis directs our attention to acts and omissions, potential wrongs result in a cascading 
response as a ‘legal system’ engages its mechanism. Particular norms, structures, offices, actions 
and spaces come to the foreground: the police, lawyers and judges, but also police call-handlers 
and administrators, para-legals, receptionists, clerks, cleaners, warders, bailiffs and prison officers. 
Legal analysis focuses on different parts of the scene, on the actors who stand out and perform 
parts of the legal system. At the heart of this is a question of aesthetics. By this, I do not mean the 
aesthetics of art galleries and cinema screens, it is not the 18th century European question of the 
beautiful. Instead, as we developed in the introduction, this is the question generated by the Greek 
term aisthesis: that of sense perception or the conditions of perceptibility. The conducting of 
attention to particular parts of a legal scene is a conditioning of legal perception. Legal analysis 
tends to ‘foreground’ particular aspects of the legal scene, but in this article, I want to suggest that 
affective ‘background’ of the legal order is more important in everyday life than the foreground 
action. Background is a theatrical term suggesting something that fades from view – a backdrop 
or setting. It is the basis from which something can come to the middle or foreground. But it is 
precisely not where ‘the action’ happens (foreground) nor is it a space of reason or synthesis (middle 
ground). The background is scenic in the sense that it ‘sets the scene’, but it does so in a way that 
is always displaced. Without the background the middle and foreground make little sense, but at 
the same time it is only by fading from attention that we can begin to grasp it as background. Thus, 
there is something paradoxical about writing an article about the background. By focusing upon 
it, you ‘foreground’ it, and in so doing it loses its ‘backgroundness’. But at the same time, it is only 
by our inattention to the background, that it is allowed to do its scenic work.  
The article uses this paradox in two entwined ways. Firstly, this paradox of foregrounding 
the background is a useful way to think about the way law directs our attention. The background 
fades from view. But it is not secret, it happens in full view (so to speak). It is not invisible or 
occluded like the off-scene action. The background is different from the wings or the orchestra’s 
pit (in a traditional western theatre). It is not so much invisible as unobtrusive. Understanding legal 
analysis is premised on an aisthesis – it is premised upon the conditions of sensory perception – 
which help us to understand that even as it fades from attention, the background remains essential 
to the constitution of the legal scene. The background implies a different temporality to the 
foreground. The background is produced in advance, and not simply staged on the night. 
Sovereign decisions or legal acts tend to draw our attention. The acts of presidents, dictators, 
judges and bureaucrats ‘naturally’ come to the foreground as legal scenes. But the danger of these 
often spectacular events is that we miss the long processes that lead up to them. Examining the 
background, contextualising, examining the conditions of possibility is therefore an essential 
critical gesture. Against analytical responses that often decontextualise and abstract moral 
problems, the critical (legal) approach historicises and explores the nuance of the situation. The 
claim that we should pay attention to the ‘background’ is also a demand that we need to become 
sensitive to our ‘attention’ as legal theorists. Thus, the first gesture of the article is to accept the 
paradox, and foreground the background.  
The second use of this paradox is more difficult. We might initially say that the question 
of the background maps out onto that of affect. Like the scenic background, affect does not need 
conscious perception to change the scene and the bodies within it. The paradoxical thinking of the 
‘background’ as background (i.e. not foregrounding it), is a useful way to approach affect. Affective 
analysis draws out the manner in which concepts become charged, the way in which acts resonate 
with people in particular ways or the way institutions and their populations bear certain moods 
and atmospheres. Affect is not emotion, it is not necessarily perceived at all. Affects circulate as 
atmospheres, collective moods and public sentiments. They condition the capacity of bodies 
(singularly and collectively) to act. But if Massumi is to be believed, affect has escaped by the time 
we perceive emotional or other bodily changes that result from affective communication.2 Thus, 
by focusing on affective changes we have a similar problem to that of foregrounding the 
background. The affects have already resonated (in the background) by the time a body knows it, 
and in this, the danger is that we reduce the background (affect) to the foreground (emotional and 
bodily experience). The parallel work on one level, but we do also need to be careful with it. We 
cannot simply map affect onto ‘background’ because law has affective dynamics while it is in the 
foreground directing the scene so to speak, and while it is in the background gently structuring the 
capacity to act.3   
This article explores the ordinary affects of law, but the simplicity of this position belies a 
significantly less elegant argument. The article makes the case that law operates with affective 
forces in the foreground. It also operates with affective force from the background, when it fades 
from attention. And finally, there are important affects with which law moves from background 
to foreground (and vice versa). To grasp background, foreground and the movement between 
them, the article engages two important theorizations of background legality. Hans Lindhal’s work 
(among other things) draws our attention to the manner in which legal ordering unobtrusively 
structures delineations of space, time, acts and subjects. Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
identifies key aspects of law’s becoming unobtrusive, but crucially unlike Lindahl, he is attuned to 
the affective force of a ‘background’ legality. Unfortunately for our purposes here, there is a 
yawning chasm between their work – between a Heideggerian-phenomenological sense of 
transcendence and a Deleuzean pure immanence. This gap leads them to talk past one another on 
a number of key questions about law. This article neither engages the debate between these 
                                                     
2 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual (Duke University Press: Durham, 2002). Cf. Ruth Leys ‘The Turn 
to Affect: A Critique’ Critical Inquiry 37(3): 434-472 (2011); William Mazzarella ‘Affect: What is it Good 
For?’ In Suarabh Dube (ed) Enchantments of Modernity. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). William Mazzarella, 
The Mana of Mass Society (Universty of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2017) 
3 Spinoza famously explained: ‘By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power 
of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these 
affections.’ Benedict Spinoza, A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, (Princeton University Press: 
New Jersey, 1994), 154 
 
clashing ontologies, nor attempts to bridge that chasm. Instead it uses both theorists as irritants. 
The article uses the affect theorist Kathleen Stewart to abrade the smooth surface of Lindahl’s 
theorization. Scraped of its sheen and polish, Lindahl’s analysis becomes sensitized to affective 
dynamics that underlie the dynamics of legality, illegality and alegality. In turn Lindahl is used to 
irritate Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, providing a less radical reading of his insistence that law is 
an ‘extensive institutional affect’. Lindahl’s insistence on alegality (as a performance that displaces 
law’s ordering) sensitizes us to a minor reading Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, one where the law 
is not necessarily everywhere and in everything. This minor reading irritates the commitment to 
pure immanence. But ultimately, what emerges from this reading Lindahl, Stewart and 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos together, is an identification of the manners in which law can 
operate from the background.  
 
 Ordering Law’s Orders 
Hans Lindahl begins Fault Lines of Globalization with three vignettes set in a supermarket. In the 
first a group of well-off friends go into the Galerie Lafayette in Rennes after work to buy food for a 
big party. They select a top-of-the-line brand foie gras and Champagne. It is almost Christmas. 
They pay and leave. Lindahl tells us they have a memorable party.  
He uses these shoppers to underline that the legal order takes shape through spatial, 
temporal, subject-based and act-centric delineations. The shop is an ought-place, a space wherein 
certain activities are appropriate. It is differentiated from the street outside or the house where the 
party will occur. Law constructs ought-places by differentiating them. It is not simply that different 
laws apply in different spaces. Such a view reduces space to a flat domain which law enlivens by 
applying its normative determinations. Rather, the point is that space is an active participant in shaping 
the behaviour of those within it.4 In this way, law is conducted through the place itself. Lindahl 
                                                     
4 See Sarah Keenan, Subversive Property: Law and the Production of Spaces of Belonging, (Abingdon: Routledge 
2015); Irus Braverman, Nick Blomley, David Delaney, and Alexandre Kedar, (Eds) The expanding spaces of 
hints at the long lineage of critical legal geography to explain that the Galerie ‘Lafayette is only 
intelligible as the specific ought-place that it is… as part of a broader set of ought-places which 
includes, say, work-places, street-places, parking-places, and home-places.’5 The part that law plays 
in ordering spaces should be conceived as part of a web. Law also regulates the movement between 
these spaces – you could crash through the barrier to the parking-place, or through the window of 
the shopping-place, but this would violate the normative conditioning through the space.  
Alongside this everyday legal spatiality, law also allows for the differentiation and 
connection of times. ‘I know what I ought to do in the sense of the appropriate time at which to 
do something to pull off a legal act.’6 The point of these temporal and spatial determinations, 
Lindahl explains is ‘to enable and disable certain courses of action.’7 The actions themselves are 
internally differentiated and connected – the person enters the shop, puts the foie gras in a basket, 
pays and leaves. Law unites this as ‘a sale’ – a singular act. Finally, for Lindahl, law provides a 
subjective determination – the party in the Galerie Lafayette are ‘clients’, the shop is the ‘seller’. They 
take on these subjectivities by entering the ought-place/time of the shop, by undertaking the ‘act’. 
Lindahl points out that this works also to determine who can undertake certain acts: a child might 
buy the foie gras but not the champagne. Law is a concrete order. It gathers and integrates these four 
modes together in one’s everyday life: ‘one finds oneself in Lafayette (place), as a prospective client 
(subject), in the course of (time) buying a bag of potatoes and other products (content).’8 Lindahl’s 
point is simply that within the act of friends buying groceries for a party, is the law’s concrete 
unity. The supermarket thus helps us to frame the everyday concrete (as in 
material/tangible/palpable) legal order.  
                                                     
law: a timely legal geography (Redwood City CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Nick Blomley, Rights of 
passage: sidewalks and the regulation of public flow (Routledge, New York, 2011); Nick Blomley, Unsettling the city: 
urban land and the politics of property. (Routledge, New York, 2004); Nick Blomley, David Delaney, and 
Richard T Ford, (Eds.) The Legal Geographies Reader: Law, power, and space (Blackwell, Oxford, 2001).  
5 Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 19 
6 Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalisation, 21 
7 Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalisation, 21 
8 Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalisation, 24 
He sharpens this analysis when he introduces the second vignette. There, the shoppers do 
exactly the same as the first vignette, with one key difference. They do not have enough money 
when they get to the check out and so, one of their number pockets the foie gras and tries to leave 
the shop. They are caught and arrested. Again, Lindahl turns to his four-fold conception of law to 
underline the concrete determination of illegality. The normative structuring of the Galerie Lafayette 
as an ought-place is transgressed in the theft – as the shopper passes the till without paying for the 
foie gras. They also transgress the concrete temporal, subjective and content boundaries: the 
moment when they are supposed to pay, their status as client, etc.. Lindahl writes that ‘illegality 
has a ‘positive’ significance in that it renders legal order and behaviour present in a specific way… 
legal order and behaviour remain unobtrusive as long as behaviour follows its due (legal) course…. 
Illegality reveals that legal boundaries govern behaviour and also, conversely, that legal boundaries 
depend on behaviour.’9  
The transgression of legal norms makes the law at work in the first vignette suddenly 
visible. In the first vignette the law is present in a concrete sense, but it operates in the background. 
In the second vignette, law becomes obtrusive in a particular way. Lindahl adds that this 
transgression of the legal order does not really challenge the legal normativity itself. Any concrete 
mode of legal normativity presupposes the legality/illegality distinction.  
 
Affective Legality  
In Lindahl’s account, the second vignette demonstrates law’s function in the first. By transgressing 
the concrete normative order, the illegal act allows the legal determination of the 
space/time/act/subject to come to the foreground. Lindahl contrasts the two as a thought 
experiment that helps the reader to understand his argument. However, what is missing is the 
manner in which the two scenes are interwoven. The second scene haunts the first. It is an affective 
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inter-relation. It is not that there is an (emotion of) fear of arrest is in the minds of the shoppers 
in the first scene. Affect can work at a distance. Sylvian Tomkins, one of the originators of the 
current wave of affect theory, draws our attention to the way people pause at the curb before they 
cross the street: 
It is certain that most of us at the curb learn to anticipate not only danger but fear. Few 
individuals experience fear at the sight of automobiles on the street. One of the reasons 
for this is the ideo-affective organisation which informs the individual of the relevance 
of a broad range of contingencies for danger and for fear, and a set of strategies for 
coping with each of these contingencies. Thus, on the curb of a city street, if 
automobiles do not exceed 35 or 40 miles an hour and do not deviate from relatively 
straight paths… and if the individual allows a few hundred feet between himself and 
the oncoming automobiles, he characteristically crosses the street without the 
experience of either danger or fear. The affect theory (a fear theory) here operates so 
silently and effectively that it would surprise everyman if the question of fear about 
crossing the street were even to be raised. He would say, quite self-persuasively, that 
he uses his common sense so that he doesn’t need to be afraid. This is one of the major 
functions of any negative affect theory – to guide action so that negative affect is not 
experienced. It is affect acting at a distance. Just as human beings can learn to avoid 
danger, to shun or fear the flame before one is burnt, so also they can learn to avoid 
shame or fear before they are seared by the experience of such negative affect.10 
The basic dynamics of negative affect are built into road layouts. But so too are they are built into 
the law-scene of the shop. The difference being that the fear (the fear that doesn’t need to be 
experienced) at the roadside comes from the speeding car, but the fear in the shop comes from 
the legal act of ‘enforcement’. In other words, in the supermarket law relies upon an affective 
background. The shoppers in Lindahl’s first scene do not even need to think about the dangers of 
                                                     
10 Eve Sedgwick and Frank, Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader (Duke University Press: Durham, 
1995) 166 
theft. To paraphrase Tomkins, if they were asked, they would say quite persuasively that common 
sense tells them if they are caught shoplifting they might be arrested. They act ‘as if’ they were 
afraid or ashamed.11 The fact that they do not fear arrest tells us that the illegality has left an imprint. 
‘It is only when the situation violates the boundaries of the affect theory that the individual is 
exposed to the affect proper.’12  
This ‘negative affect’ is important but not because it holds any sort of extensive explanatory 
power for law. In legal theory we are familiar with these accounts of negative affect as the 
‘command theory of law’. In Austin for instance, people abide by the law because of a distant fear 
of the potential punishment. The problems of the command-sanction model of obedience are well 
established and I introduce negative affect not to return to a subterranean version of this model, 
but to begin to think about the affective forces at play in Lindahl’s account. The negative affects 
that interweave Lindahl’s first and second account are not the end-point of my analysis, but rather 
a familiar starting point. In fact, the affective dynamics of Lindahl’s scenes are far more complex 
than simply being a matter of fear (or fear). To begin to approach them, I want to introduce the 
work of the anthropologist Kathleen Stewart.  
Stewart identifies what she calls ‘ordinary affects’. These are ‘sensations, impulses and 
‘habits of relating’ that are integral to everyday life.’13 Stewart’s analysis of ordinary affects draws 
out the manner in which public feelings and intimate moods or atmospheres chime together at 
particular moments. She describes short scenes, drawn from her anthropological observations. 
These scenes do not work ‘through ‘meanings’ per se,’ she writes, we are not supposed to read 
them for their message. Rather they work ‘in the way that they pick up density and texture as they 
                                                     
11 Silvan Tomkins, The Silvan Tomkins Reader, 167 
12 Silvan Tomkins, The Silvan Tomkins Reader, 167 
13 Helen Nicholson, ‘Affective Labours of Cultural Participation’ in Anna Harpin, and Helen Nicholson, 
Performance and Participation: Practices, Audiences, Politics, (MacMillan, 2016) 126. Stewart writes: ‘The ordinary 
throws itself together out of forms, flows, powers, pleasures, encounters, distractions, drudgery, denials, 
practical pleasures, encounters, distractions, drudgery, denials, practical solutions, shape-shifting forms if 
violence, daydreams, and opportunities lost or found. Or it falters, fails. But either way we feel its pull.’ 
(Kathleen Stewart Ordinary Affects, (Duke University Press: Durham, 2007) 29)  
move through bodies, dreams, dramas and social worldings of all kinds. Their significance lies in 
the intensities they build and in what thoughts and feelings they make possible.’14 The affects that 
flow through these scenes are not simply ‘local’. They can crystallise the dynamics of national or 
global constellations. She poses her analyses against the established critical theory of 2007 – the 
moment when Ordinary Affects was published:  
This book is set in a United States caught in a present that began some time ago. But 
it suggests that the terms neoliberalism, advanced capitalism, and globalisation that 
index this emergent present, and the five or seven or ten characteristics used to 
summarize and define it in shorthand, do not in themselves begin to describe the 
situation we find ourselves in.15 
She does not deny the forces that those systems of thought try to name, but in effect denies the 
model in which social structures create local effects.16 She suggests that by thinking about the 
ordinary affects of the forces (which neoliberalism for instance, tries to name), she is bringing 
‘them into view as a scene of immanent force’, instead of ‘dead effects imposed on an innocent 
world’.17  
The ordinary is a shifting assemblage of practices and practical knowledges, a scene of 
both liveness and exhaustion, a dream of escape or of the simple life. Ordinary affects 
are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday life the 
quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies and emergencies.18 
                                                     
14 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 3 
15 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 1 
16 This echo of the debate between Tarde and Durkheim has re-emerged recently in social theory: See 
Matei Candea The Social after Gabriel Tarde: Debates and Assessments (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 
particularly Bruno Latour ‘Tarde’s idea of Quantification’ and Nigel Thrift, ‘Pass it on: Towards a 
Political Economy of Propensity, (also published in 1.2 Emotion, Society, Space (2008), 83-96). See also 
Nigel Thrift, Non-Representational Theory, (Routledge, 2007) Nigel Thrift and Andrew Barry, ‘Gabriel Tarde: 
Imitation, Invention and Economy,’ Economy and Society (2007) 509, and Brian Massumi ‘The Future Birth 
of Affective Fact: The Political Ontology of Threat’ in Mellisa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth, The Affect 
Theory Reader. For the Durkheim debate, see William Mazzarella The Mana of Mass Society. 
17 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 1 
18 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 1-2 
The book then progresses by way of a series of brief scenes where affective intensities congeal and 
flow.  
Stewart is particularly useful for our purposes, because her scenes allow the affective to 
remain in the background. Each scene stages the ‘question of what counts as an event, a 
movement, an impact, a reason to react.’19 Each scene allows the events to unfold, but by 
sensitizing the reader to watch and listen for the affects that flow (as background) through the 
scenes, she performs the paradoxical relation of keeping background as background. This is not 
to the exclusion of historicising and contextualising of classical critical (legal) theory. ‘Being moved’ 
does not simply spring up from nowhere. There is a long process of conditioning – particularly in 
political and legal spheres where the populace is the object-target.20 Attachments, investments, 
resonances and intensities are produced through sensitisation, association and other modes of 
what we might call ‘sentimental education’. Thus, we might think about Brexit in the UK at least 
partially as a result of the longstanding antipathy of most of the print media to the EU, and the 
continual negative tone in which its actions were reported (or made up) for thirty years. This is 
very clearly a ‘sentimental education’ of large swathes of the populace.  
It is unhelpful to simply identify Lindahl’s contrast of legality/illegality with fear and 
anxiety. It is important to begin to give luminance to different aspects of law’s ordinary affects. To 
do this, I want to suggest that we might begin by twisting Stewart’s method slightly. She writes 
that:  
Ordinary Affects is written as an assemblage of disparate scenes that pull the course of 
the book into a tangle of trajectories, connections, and disjunctures. Each scene begins 
anew the approach to the ordinary from an angle set off by the scene’s affects. And 
                                                     
19 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 15-6 
20 See Ben Anderson, Encountering Affect (Routledge: Abingdon, 2016),  Lauren Berlant, The Queen of 
America Goes to Washington City (Duke University Press: Durham, 1997)  
each scene is a tangent that performs the sensation that something is happening – 
something that needs attending to.21  
Her scenes are ethnographic observations, but they draw their energy from the ‘ficto-critical’ work 
of Stern, Taussig and Lingis.22 They stage the ordinary, but in a way that allows the affective 
constellation to remain in the background. The reader is sensitized to the affective background as 
background. I introduce this method here in order to irritate Lindahl’s account of the concrete 
order of everyday legality. Lindahl’s vignettes are thought experiments that aim to draw out the 
background/foreground. But, for the most part, they effectively excise the affective dynamics of 
the scenes. We can re-tell his ficto-critical stories in a different key. Instead of illuminating the 
background/foreground, the aim is to give luminance to the complex interplay of affective 
dynamics that might play out in these scenes. 
 
 Re-inserting Ordinary Affects 
Lindahl’s vignettes are a curious mix of very specific detail (the city, the Galerie Lafayette, the date, 
etc.) and terse description of the action. He tells the story of the group quickly. But for all of this, 
the narratives do signal some of the ordinary affects that might circulate. Indeed, like all thought 
experiments, there is the need of something beyond thought.23 The Galerie Lafayette is not just 
any supermarket. It is an up-market exclusive city-center department store. The store in Rennes is 
not as fancy as the Paris ‘Housmann’ Galerie Lafayette which looks more like the interior of a 19th 
century opera house, but Lindahl’s choice of this particular site (whether intentional or not) 
intensifies the affective dynamics which the reader intuits (or perhaps which Lindahl imagines 
                                                     
21 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 5 
22 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 6-7 
23 It is worth noting here that Lindahl’s accounts are fictional, they are ‘thought experiments’ that ground 
his theory of law in an everyday setting. But as with all ‘thought experiments’, the aim is to engage something 
beyond thought. Philippa Foot’s classic ‘trolley experiment’, for instance, remains irresolvable precisely 
because the rational solutions of whether to allow many to die or to kill one, are confounded with the 
affective dynamics of killing. What is more, however, the resolvability gives a certain feeling of thought. 
The trolley problem resonates as a feeling of thought, and proves deeply attractive despite the deep 
decontextualization (and simplification) involved in much of moral theory.  
playing to the attachments of his readers). So, trying to bring these elements out, let us examine 
our first law-scene: 
Stacking shelves has a certain rhythm. Each tin is taken from its box, placed on the 
shelf, facing forward in exactly the same direction. There is a rhythm – a care and 
attention. I used to work in an Hypermarche where these things didn’t matter. Nobody 
paid any attention there.  
Today a kid broke a jar of sauce, his mother called me over. Smile: ‘of course, Madame’. 
Smile: ‘certainly, not a problem’. Attitude, the right kind of attitude. Careful. Smile. The 
kid is a brat. He pushed against my back while I crouched to sweep up the splatter of 
shards and paste. I nearly put my knee into the smudge of Green Thai Curry Paste and 
broken glass. Smile. Move away. But smile. The mental image of a shard of glass jutting 
from my knee: cut tights and bloody blouse. It would be another uniform infraction.  
I go back to the shelves: tinned peas take fourteen minutes, assorted lentils another 
eight. Slow time. When I am called to a till it speeds up again. The shop is busier than 
before. A large group in particular. Nearly thirty by the looks of it. They have collected 
all of the foie gras and most of the best champagne. More shelves to be stacked. Are 
they all men? They are laughing and joking loudly, and one of them tries to invite me 
to their party. Smile. I have been told. Each day. Smile. His friends jibe and banter. I 
hear them discuss me as they leave.  
Lindahl’s point is that the party-shoppers belong to the space, and their behavior is shaped by the 
ought-space of the food department. And it is true that they belong, but not simply because they 
fulfill the normative determination made by law. We intuit that they ‘belong’ to the scene in a 
much deeper sense. They buy the most expensive foie gras in a fancy shop, they have a big party, 
they burst with the confidence of privilege. It is not just that they act legally because of negative 
affects, because they fear arrest. There is a whole affective constellation behind their acts. This 
affective constellation completely exceeds the limited sense in which law is conducted through the 
space. However, insofar as law is relevant in the scene, it is inseparable from these affective 
dynamics.  
The woman at the till who has to deal with the entitled presence of the shoppers, belongs 
to the scene in a different way to the shoppers. She is given subject and forms of action like the 
group. But these are entangled in a web of anxieties, resentment and other ‘ugly feelings’ of 
precarious labour.24 Like the affects exuded by the shoppers, affects flow from and through her. 
By contrasting these modes of belonging to the law-scene, we begin to think differently about law’s 
ordinary affects. It is not just that law gathers particular acts together, or divides subjects or spaces. 
But that it surges through actors and spaces, energizing certain relations and exhausting particular 
ways of being in that space. Lindahl’s scene is full of the relations of late capitalism. But not as 
abstract forces. They are embodied in the positions and desires of those present. These affects 
flow through the bodies, and stick differently to them.  
The function of affect in the second vignette is more immediately obtrusive. But we can 
begin to draw out a different luminance as well. The people who put the foie gras in their pockets 
just can’t afford it. They do it in a moment of fantasy, filled with trepidation and hope (perhaps). 
They thought that they had enough money, they have not come here to break the law Lindahl 
hints. Stewart writes: 
We shop. Sometimes, or all the time. Too much or not enough. With flare or with 
shame. For necessities, for therapy, on vacation. At Dollar Store or Neiman Marcus or 
Sears, depending…. If you have plenty of disposable income, that’s one thing. If you 
have no money at all, that’s another thing. If money is tight, you’re supposed to shop 
with mind-numbing, penny-pinching care. All those coupons. All those catalogues, the 
fantasies, the games of imagining having this thing or that and what you would do with 
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it. Then the splurges on a tub of ice-cream or the suicidal squandering of a trip to Las 
Vegas.25 
There is a politics of class affects in Lindhal’s second vignette. But rather than focusing on the 
shoppers – a melodrama that is more likely to identify my political and social investments than 
anything else – let us instead investigate a different site: 
The trick of watching is to focus on one person, one screen at a time. And definitely 
not the full wall of screens. You can’t just look at all of the monitors because you 
wouldn’t see anything. But you watch the entrances and you pick them out as they come 
in. And then you can follow their movement. It’s rarely their cheap clothes and shaggy 
hair that give them away. The security guards at the door keeps those types of problems 
out. I couldn’t tell you what it is specifically, but I can pick them out the moment that 
they come into the shop! It’s like a second sight or something.  
Our cameras are brilliant, I mean they are fully functional. You can zoom right in, 
swivel through 360 degrees. But you can also rewind digitally. So you never miss 
anything. When they slipped the foie gras into their trench coat pockets it was like a 
neon sign. With this system we have cut shoplifting by 27% year-on-year.  
I mean I never get to actually stop them myself, but I watch it. I love panning the 
camera around to the shocked on-lookers as the security guards swoop in. It’s quite 
satisfying you know. Like you’ve achieved something. I mean sometimes they are quite 
discrete about it, and they just bring them back here to wait for the police. But 
sometimes, when they want to make an example of them they hold them out by the 
tills where everyone can see. I prefer that. 
In Lindahl’s account there is a certain inevitability in the fact that the ‘shoppers’ are caught. In this 
moment, the affective dynamics of theft disappear. Gone is the thrill of (potentially) getting away 
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with it, the thrill of transgression, the relief at having something (fancy) to eat. Gone too are the 
affective dynamics of the employees.  
Lindahl’s account sees no pleasure, and barely any pain (at a stretch the reader might pause 
on the pain of the shoppers caught short). But the security guard’s account is an attempt to pull 
out the enjoyments of the scene. He describes the emotional pleasures of panning the camera 
around to watch the people gathered, there is enjoyment in the spectator’s shock. We might 
imagine that on a normal day when no shoplifters are caught, the job is fairly mundane. The event 
of catching a shoplifter has the draw of a satisfaction, and this manifests itself as an affective pull. 
This affective pull becomes emotions of pleasure if they are caught.  
 
 Alegality  
The third of Lindahl’s three vignettes is radically different to the first two. A group of people enter 
into the same Galerie Lafayette. They collect the same produce, also with a view to throwing a sort 
of party. However, when they get to the check-out they split up. They stand three deep at each 
cashier, and one by one they all refuse to pay for the produce, politely requesting that the manager 
give them the food for free so that they can distribute it to the poor. These are the Mouvement des 
chômeurs et précaires en lutte who undertake autoréduction actions (literally self-discounts). Following a 
long period of stalemate, with the queues growing and customers getting frustrated, the manager 
enters negotiations with the chômeurs en lutte. He ultimately allows them to leave with half of the 
produce that they had sought. Lindahl insists that theirs is not illegality. They do not break any 
laws. But nor do they accept the normatively structured nature of the place in which they are 
situated. The chômeurs en lutte refuse to recognise the manner in which law is conducted through 
this space. They challenge the very nature of this ought-place. This challenge leads Lindahl to 
suggest that theirs’ is an act of a-legality.  
The absence of illegality from the protestors is a clever strategic move which leads to the 
success of the action. However, it is not crucial to the conception of alegality. Alegality has two 
elements, firstly, it is a turning away from the question of legality/illegality. It is a refusal to be 
determined by this pairing. As such, that the autoréduction did not transgress any laws is not essential 
to its alegality, for this would simply reassert legality as once again being determinative. The second 
element which is more important in this context, is that alegality is an act or omission which brings 
the nature of legality/illegality itself to light. It does this by showing a strange outside-of-law that 
lies hidden within the fabric of every legal determination. The shop (like every ought-space) could 
be otherwise. ‘[A]legal behavior… contests the orderliness of the law itself by revealing the residual 
groundlessness of what that order calls (il)legality. In other words, struggle is the overt 
manifestation of the irreducible contingency of legal orders.’26 Lindahl underlines that law is 
fabricated. It is full of layers and seams. At each seam the fabric can be torn. The alegal might 
make the legal fabric visible by rupturing it, by denying its determination. At the moment of 
rupture we glimpse the flesh beneath the legal fabric. ‘Every spatial boundary of a legal order, even 
the most ‘mundane’ and apparently insignificant, is also a limit that renders it discontinuous with 
a strange outside’.27  
A-legality is at once the limit of law, and essential to it. There is always the possibility of a 
tear at each legal seam. Thus, we might begin to imagine the autoréduction in terms of the pull of 
the event: We could think of the nervous energy of the chômeurs en lutte as they arrive at the 
supermarket, as they collect the produce into their trolleys; The sudden shock of the workers as 
they are faced with the extraordinary demands; The tense atmosphere as the queues build; And 
the release when a settlement is reached. But on an affective level, it is essential to see that the legal 
order will very quickly patch the tear in its fabric. The suddenly obtrusive legal relations will very 
quickly fade back into invisibility as the force of the ordinary kicks in once more: 
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Nothing like this had been covered in my induction, or any of our training workshops. 
I guess I had to improvise on the day. You might think that it was easy to call the 
police, but here at the Galerie Layfayette we pride ourselves on discretion. I am 
sympathetic, of course. I give regularly to Medcines Sans Frontiers. But the Galerie is a 
place of business. You have to be reasonable. I invited them to my office to talk it all 
through. But they just kept shouting. I wanted to give them a chance to explain 
themselves. I wanted to enter a dialogue. It was not fair that they were disrupting our 
proper customers.  
We pride ourselves on convenience and quality. Everyone was on edge. I could see 
after a while that our takings for the day were going to suffer. Clients were leaving 
without buying anything. And the police. I mean, they are brutes really. Everything 
sped up when they came bursting in. Suddenly there were so many of them gathered 
around the tills. They weren’t happy when I agreed to give the clowns some of the 
produce they wanted. But violence would have been a disaster. I mean this is a place 
of business.  
I am sure that some of our clients would have liked to see a few heads knocked 
together, but you can never be sure how people will react. It might have taken us 
months to recover from the scandal. I have proposed to head office that I lead a role-
play for this type of situation at our next regional away day. It would be good to cascade 
these experiences going forward. 
If Lindahl is correct, this manager has just witnessed the very legal constitution of space, time, 
subject and act come apart at the seams. If law is like a fabric it changes bodies and shapes them. 
But it can be changed and it can be torn. The manager is standing beside a tear, but his first reaction 
is to return to the everyday fabric of legal relations. He desires the return of the ordinary. Precisely 
in this exceptional moment when the very stakes of lawful relations are made obtrusive, the 
ordinary continues to pull everything back. Everyday relations crowd back in, and pull the actors 
back to the everyday situation. There is a sort of draw of stasis at play, a return to habitual relations. 
 
Affective Legality 
For Lindahl’s The Fault Lines of Globalisation it was essential to make law obtrusive so that we can 
begin to identify this fourfold determination of law’s concrete order. But we have also seen that 
law can be made obtrusive in a way that confirms (illegality) or which undermines (alegality) the 
legal determination. Already then it is more complex than the simple obtrusive/unobtrusive 
dichotomy. Once we add the affective dynamics this duality collapses. It is necessary to begin to 
think about the affects with which law takes the foreground, and the atmospheres that are 
generated when law remains in the background. This is more than the texture of the events. The 
affective dynamics of a legal scene effect the actions of those involved. On this point, it is useful 
to introduce Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s theory of the lawscape. Like Lindahl, 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is also a thinker of the legal background. But if Lindahl’s emphasis 
was on the dynamics of obtrusiveness, here the focus is on invisibilisation – on the becoming-
background.  
To begin with, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues that understanding law and space as 
distinct questions misses the tautological relation between them. One is always already in the other, 
there is not ‘Law’ and ‘Space’ but only a spatialised law and a legalised space. He identifies what 
he calls the lawscape to convey this sense of the co-immanence of law and space. He argues that 
law (like space) is immanent in all bodies and things. But it is not enough to say that law is 
everywhere, he argues that this immanent law ‘emanates from every body’.28 Whether human or 
non-human, whether animal, vegetable or mineral: ‘Every body lawscapes.’29 For Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos there is no outside of law. When we walk down an urban street we are surrounded 
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with property forms, contracts call out to us, we move with traffic regulation, we smell health and 
safety regulations, we lean up against building regulations. The contracts say ‘come and buy me, 
look at these shoes, imagine the taste of this food’; The footpaths demand footsteps, without 
loitering feet or obstructive rear-ends; The regulations are in that mild smell of new furniture or a 
new car, the maximum formaldehyde regulations that manage the dyes in fabric. We are a knot of 
rights and duties. And we extend temporally through past, present and future legal forms. The 
student’s shoulders weigh their debt, the past its sell-by-date food in our bellies, the contract for 
our shopping to which we are walking. He argues that whatever we do, we are law-ing. We are 
constantly performing elements of the legal assemblages.  
Crucially, for Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos the lawscape is an affective legality. Law 
structures the world from the background (although this is not a term he would use). In the 
lawscape, law tends to become invisible. ‘[I]n/visibilisation is not just a game on the side, but the 
lawscape’s only mechanism of ontological continuation’.30 When law becomes invisible it does not 
lose its effect. Quite the contrary, invisibility intensifies its effects. For Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos the way that law fades from the foreground is a essential for its continuation. He 
theorises this invisibility as law becoming ‘atmospheric’. Law becomes atmospheric when it 
dissimulates itself, when it disguises or conceals its operation. Atmospheres are the perfect hiding 
place for legal power, he tells us: ‘We are all inside atmospheres…. Yet we are not aware of the 
atmosphere. [As such a]n atmosphere is the perfect enclosure’.31 As law becomes atmospheric we 
become completely inured to its structuring presence. We acclimatise and once this acclimatisation 
takes place, the lawscape withdraws. The atmosphere then captures the person by stoking desire. 
‘The bodies captured in an atmosphere for just a little longer, as long as possible, or as long as 
‘needed’. This means that ‘need’ is constructed within an atmosphere, autopoetically eating its own 
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tail. I discover my needs when I am faced with the ‘product’ that meets them.’32 Law then is an 
‘expansive institutional affect’, a diffused set of forces capable of conducting our desires in ways 
that are invisible to us. Perhaps the most important element of this analysis of invisibility 
(background), is that the desires conducted in the lawscape manifest themselves also as a desire 
for the lawscape. In his way, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos underlines pull of the ordinary. 
As noted at the outset, there is a yawning chasm between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s 
pure immanence and Lindahl’s radical outside of law (alegality). My aim here is not to find some 
sort of agreement between the two theorists. For Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (quoting López): 
‘Nothing can be… outside the law. Illegality, alegality, extra- or infralegality are forms that, either 
by opposition or subversion, necessarily take a legal system as a reference and are as such 
constituted by it’.33 He insists that because alegality is structured by its relation to legality, it cannot 
escape the folds of law. In contrast, for Lindahl alegality has a relation to law in the sense that it 
disarticulates law’s determinations of space, subject, act and/or time. It is the act of bringing law 
to particular forms of affective obtrusiveness. But he insists that the act of alegality renders law 
obtrusive from the outside, by turning away from and refusing the legal determination. Law is 
something to be produced in things, places and people. It must be performed, and we do this 
habitually and by choice. But just as it may be produced in (and by) bodies, so too may this 
production be disrupted. This might be in the name of a new legality (as Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos complains every apparently anomic revolutionary ultimately resorts to), but it might 
also be a refusal of the current legal terms.  
The reason that I have read Lindahl and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos together is not for 
the inevitably foregrounded disagreement about whether law is purely immanent with no outside 
(lawscape), or whether it is possible to generate a transcendent outside of modern legality 
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(alegality). What is exciting about both of them is that despite this fundamental disagreement, they 
both agree upon the force of unobtrusive legality and the potential of becoming obtrusive. In this 
sense, they both draw our attention to an ‘affective legality’: forces that are entangled in legal 
scenes, forces that affect the capacities to act of those involved, and shift the significance of their 
scenes.  
 
   
The Spheres of Affect 
While I have relied heavily on affect theory throughout to irritate and sensitise Lindahl and 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, affect itself has remained somewhat nebulous. So before I 
conclude, I want to grasp the affective dynamics of the legal scene in a much more nuanced 
manner. We can think about three different spheres of affect that constitute the affective forces at 
play in any given legal scene. On the most obvious level there are affects which pass through the 
people involved in each of the stories. We might imagine the types of trepidation in the managers 
stomach when the police arrive, the anger in the clenched jaw of the woman on the tills as she is 
patronized by the shoppers or the pride that bursts from the chest of the security guard as he 
catches the thief. These are bodily receptions, simmering on the edge of perception. The bodily 
changes help to determine particular responses. But at the same time, the affects are not simply 
individual emotional responses. Affects circulate, they flow through bodies. They stick to some 
bodies and slip off others. The clenched jaw of the woman at the till is there for anyone to see, to 
sense the tonality and texture of the moment.  
Affect draws our attention to resonance, the question of ‘being moved’. What makes a 
body resonate is itself determined by mood and situation, among a great many other elements.34 
Affect is an ‘intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to 
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another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act.’35 The 
manager’s worry about how his consumers will react, demonstrates precisely this dynamic. His 
actions are guided not just by the socio-cultural education of his sentiments, but also by his 
understanding of the affective dimensions of those acts. ‘Consumerism has affect as its main 
operator; it exercises us in insignificant micro-decisions, drilling our readiness to prefer and reject 
far beyond what is relevant to any needs we might have.’36 The manager’s worry is that these events 
will change whatever affective propensity the consumers have for his store. He does not know the 
shopper’s views or the strength of their convictions on the Chômeurs en lutte and the police, and so 
he cannot predict any changes in their perception of the store and the intensity of their inclination 
towards shopping there. But at the same time, the manager is ‘being moved’ by his customer’s 
inclinations and attachments. In this case he is moved to anxiety, worry and fear. His care for the 
consumer’s desires and his attachment to the role as manager, are all equally part of the circulation 
of affect within the scene. 
A second way to approach the affective situation in the shop is to think of ‘atmosphere’. 
The affective atmosphere in the shop is a shifting affective pattern of intensities. For instance, in 
the stand-off with the Chômeurs en lutte, we might imagine that the shop is generally perturbed and 
unsettled, but the area around the tills is more intense than that at the furthest corner of the store. 
Indeed depending on the layout of the shop – the shape of the space, the lighting, the people 
present – it may be that there are parts of the store that are not affected by this particular site of 
conflict. Within the affective intensity of the stand-off, the atmosphere is determined by a 
multitude of different factors. The dimensions of the space, the materials used in construction and 
layout of the tills and aisles,37 the height of the ceilings, the light, sounds and smells, the 
comportment of the people involved. Marketing theory and environmental psychology generate 
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psychological codes in spaces of consumption like this. Shops are coded as cheap or expensive, 
lush and stripped back. We are supposed to enjoy the experience and the easy flow through the 
space, or struggle with the space to experience the joy of the bargain. But the spatial dynamics are 
only the first part of a cyclical relation, where those within the space (both employees and 
customers) perform the affective dynamics of the space. The priest and parishioners perform the 
hushed tones and cautious atmosphere of the cathedral, the fans and players perform the 
excitement of the stadium. Thus, we might say that it is only the first story that is an everyday 
atmosphere. In the second and third story the spatial dynamics are disrupted by unusual events. 
The atmospheres there are not those designed into the space.  
 Moving to a different sphere again, we might begin to situate the events in collective moods 
or the zeitgeist of the era. These too would have an effect on the scenes, but in a more diffuse 
manner. Raymond Williams identified what he called the ‘structure of feeling’. This is a particular 
affective constellation that operates in time and place: ‘a particular quality of social experience and 
relationship, historically distinct from other particular qualities, which gives the sense of a 
generation or of a period.’38 He further specifies two key elements of structures of feeling: ‘first 
they are changes of presence’ in the sense that the structure of feeling affects ‘elements of impulse, 
restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling 
against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present 
kind, in a living and interrelating continuity.’39 And secondly, although structures of feeling ‘are 
emergent or pre-emergent, they do not have to await definition, classification, or rationalization 
before they exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on experience and on action.’40 We 
might restage the supermarket stories in the ‘long hot summer’ of race riots in 1967 in the USA. 
Instead of France, the up-market store might be in the functionally segregated Detroit or Newark, 
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where police over-reach lead to massive riots. The Kerner Presidential Commission on the 1967 
riots described how disorder emerged from an increasingly ‘disturbed social atmosphere’. In this, 
‘tension-heightening  incidents… became linked… with a reservoir of underlying grievances. At 
some point in the mounting tension, a further incident – in itself often routine or trivial – became 
the breaking point and the tension spilled over into violence’.41 This period of affective unrest is 
more than simply an iteration of particular situational atmospheres. The atmospheres articulate 
with one another to create that experience of tension. In this sense, it is important that Lindahl’s 
events occur in the 2008. The same actions would carry different affects in Paris in the 1968 or 
1898, or indeed in late 2018 among the gilet jaunes protests. Would the pull of the ordinary be quite 
the same in 2018 or 1968? Would the desires for the big ruptural event carry greater valence in a 
perturbed social atmosphere where tensions around poverty and power marked the public mood?  
Crucially, these are nestled affective spheres: The affects which attach to bodies are the 
atmospheric affects, and the atmospheric affects take place in the ‘structure of feeling’. In this 
sense a scalar analysis is distinctly unhelpful – these are not micro, meso and macro affects. Such 
an analysis suggests that three distinct levels, each with their own dynamics. I have instead talked 
about spheres – in a nod to Sloterdijk’s bubbles and foams.42 Sabrina Lilleby captures this well – 
writing about the shift during the revolution in Cairo: 
A few years ago, despite living with a despot, many dwellers of Cairo considered 
artefacts such as tanks, machine guns, barbed wire and sandbags as belonging to a war-
zone, not to their intimate milieu. Yet, with the events that unravelled in the spring of 
2011, dwellers of Cairo were tossed into a perplexing everyday where they have gained 
immediate experience with the objects and acts one supposed belonged to warfare. 
However, instead of being brought to a standstill, halted by fear, the city trudges on 
and the previously mentioned items, together with explosions, check points, brick 
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walls, balaclava clad soldiers and executions have become part and parcel of the 
everyday. These items mix with the mundane tasks of cooking, chatting, singing, 
drinking, eating, fucking and crying. In subsuming these novel objects, the cadence and 
pulse of the ordinary skips a beat and then returns to its rhythmic beat. What happens 
when people are not unnerved; when the extraordinary becomes the ordinary, or when 
panic mixes with anger, happiness or lust? Something happens, but it cannot be 
properly named. It hits us more like a mood, a pressure in the atmosphere or 
reverberations in the ambience.43 
The benefit of thinking about nestled spheres is that we can see that the vague affects of the 
‘structure of feeling’ colour the atmosphere of the shop itself and the affects which pass through 
each of those involved. These spheres are not self-enclosed, they leak into one another. The 
intensity and pressure in one affects the next, perhaps not in the same way or with the same 
intensity, but nonetheless they change one another.  
 Examining legal scenes through the lens of affect helps us to think about the particular 
attachments, identifications, resonances and sentiments of legal interactions and relations. There 
are not distinctly legal affects, but rather law mobilises different affective dynamics at different 
moments. What’s more, because each scene plays out with plural audiences, with different actors 
and in different affective contexts, the dynamics mobilised are often different from moment to 
moment. This is not entirely new, we have seen affecto-legal analyses of fishing disputes, 
immigration and citizenship debates, the racial politics of US constitutionalism, international 
criminal trials and states of emergency.44 What emerges from these are the many ways in which the 
doing of ‘law’, involves the plural mobilisations of constellations of affect. 
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 Conclusion 
The aim of this article has been to draw out the question of the background, to think about the 
ways in which law might shape activity in ways that escape our attention. This has required that 
we displace the spectacular scenes of power (the legal foreground where our attention is drawn to 
the decisions of police officers, judges and presidents). The aim has been to examine the 
background as background. But to make this work as a journal article, I have placed Lindahl and 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos into the foreground, and allowed the contrast between a purely 
immanent law and the question of alegality to be a focal point. While it may have frustrated some 
readers that I have refused to simply take a position on this, my aim throughout has been to 
sensitise the reader to the different dynamics of the background that Lindahl and Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos stage.  
Lindahl’s account of legal obtrusiveness, and the manner in which he contrasted the 
obtrusiveness of illegality and alegality, is useful because it allows us to think through the relation 
between legal obtrusiveness and social or legal change. We might think of other similar acts of 
legal obtrusiveness – the Whirl-Mart movement for instance:  
The Whirl-Mart culture jamming event consists of a group of supposed shoppers who 
congregate at a large superstore…, slowly push empty shopping carts through store 
aisles, not purchase anything, and form a lengthy chain of non-shoppers – weaving and 
‘whirling’ through a maze of store aisles for hours at a time… culture jamming is a 
form of disruption that plays on the emotions of viewers to evoke behavioral change 
and political action.45 
These movements challenge the social and legal significance of the supermarket, but they do so 
by grinding upon everyone therein. Their long lines of empty trolleys, meandering down aisles full 
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of produce, create increasingly fraught atmospheres.46 Much of the space of the article has been 
spent pluralizing Lindahl’s account of legal unobtrusiveness (underlining the affective dynamics 
that circulate around the law-workers – at the tills, behind camera or managing from the back 
rooms). This is important because it allows us to see the everyday labour of managing these 
ordinary spaces. These law-workers are important as they shepherd unobtrusive legality. They keep 
the law, allowing it to conduct from the background.  
At the same time, these law-workers bring the law to the foreground. They shout at the 
chomeurs en lutte and detain the foie-gras shoplifters. They set the wheels in motion. We could 
imagine all three of my fictional law-workers saying (in different tones and with different 
resonances): ‘This is now a matter for the law’ (or ‘for the police’ perhaps). But the point here has 
been that it was always a matter of law, it is just that it was in the background. The affective 
conditions of this movement from background to foreground are also important: they condition 
the class or race or gender dimensions of the interactions in the aisles or at the tills. Affective 
legality is a way to think about the background of the legal scene and the way in which this 
background can suddenly become everything in the scene. With law in the foreground we can 
become sensitised to the ordinary affects that would otherwise go unacknowledged (but effective). 
Finally, it is important to insist upon the movement from the foreground to the background. The 
action that takes place in the foreground today will gradually fade. Soon it will be the background 
of the next action. The Kerner report underlined this gradual accretion of insults that lead up to 
the race riots of the summer of 1967 – tension-heightening incidents that become linked together. 
Each incident is a foreground that fades. But it doesn’t disappear. Instead it becomes an ever 
intensifying ‘white noise’ in the background. As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos insisted, we 
acclimatise to the lawscape. But what we acclimatise to is not static or unchanging. It is the affective 
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and atmospheric dynamics of our time. As legal theorists we need to become more sensitive to 
these dynamics. 
 
